This book addresses key conceptual issues relating to the modern scientific and engineering use of computer simulations. It analyses a broad set of questions, from the nature of computer simulations to their epistemological power, including the many scientific, social and ethics implications of using computer simulations. The book is written in an easily accessible narrative, one that weaves together philosophical questions and scientific technicalities. It will thus appeal equally to all academic scientists, engineers, and researchers in industry interested in questions (...) related to the general practice of computer simulations. (shrink)

This article aims to develop a new account of scientific explanation for computer simulations. To this end, two questions are answered: what is the explanatory relation for computer simulations? And what kind of epistemic gain should be expected? For several reasons tailored to the benefits and needs of computer simulations, these questions are better answered within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Unlike previous efforts in the literature, I submit that the explanatory relation is between the simulation model and the (...) results of the simulation. I also argue that our epistemic gain goes beyond the unificationist account, encompassing a practical dimension as well. (shrink)

This study investigates the debt owed by contemporary theological anthropology to the philosophical anthropology of the first half of the twentieth century (considered in its interest in interpersonal character of human identity). It should be recognized that there was a fairly complex relationship between them: sometimes anthropology ended up in some way forgetting theology, sometimes theology was sustained by anthropology and, often, invited to self-criticism. Analyzing «pneumatological» anthropology (and its Christological roots) elaborated by Ferdinand Ebner (1882- 1931) helps theological anthropology (...) not to forget that its method of investigation has to clarify both sides of the analogy between God and man in order to fully integrate the «expressive» meaning of both logics: theo-logic and anthropo-logic. (shrink)

Abstract This chapter is interested in the epistemology of algorithms. As I intend to approach the topic, this is an issue about epistemic justification. Current approaches to justification emphasize the transparency of algorithms, which entails elucidating their internal mechanisms –such as functions and variables– and demonstrating how (or that) these produce outputs. Thus, the mode of justification through transparency is contingent on what can be shown about the algorithm and, in this sense, is internal to the algorithm. In contrast, I (...) advocate for an externalist epistemology of algorithms that I term computational reliabilism (CR). While I have previously introduced and examined CR in the field of computer simulations ([42, 53, 4]), this chapter extends this reliabilist epistemology to encompass a broader spectrum of algorithms utilized in various scientific disciplines, with a particular emphasis on machine learning applications. At its core, CR posits that an algorithm’s output is justified if it is produced by a reliable algorithm. A reliable algorithm is one that has been specified, coded, used, and maintained utilizing reliability indicators. These reliability indicators stem from formal methods, algorithmic metrics, expert competencies, cultures of research, and other scientific endeavors. The primary aim of this chapter is to delineate the foundations of CR, explicate its operational mechanisms, and outline its potential as an externalist epistemology of algorithms. (shrink)

Una imagen muy generalizada a la hora de entender el software de computador es la que lo representa como una “caja negra”: no importa realmente saber qué partes lo componen internamente, sino qué resultados se obtienen de él según ciertos valores de entrada. Al hacer esto, muchos problemas filosóficos son ocultados, negados o simplemente mal entendidos. Este artículo discute tres unidades de análisis del software de computador, esto es, las especificaciones, los algoritmos y los procesos computacionales. El objetivo central es (...) entender las prácticas cientficas e ingenieriles detrás de cada unidad de software, así como analizar su metodología, ontología y epistemología. (shrink)

This study critically explores, in the light of Christian theology, the singular inter- pretation that François Laruelle (1937) makes of the figure of Christ and his relation- ship with human being. First, we approach the way in which Laruelle’s Christology challenges the abidance between the apostolic narrative and the believing compre- hension about the unity between the Mystery of God and the Event of Jesus Christ. According to Laruelle, Christ has not only raised human freedom beyond the essence and existence (...) of an absolute (and, therefore, the founding axioms of Philosophy that require a prior foundation of the founded); but Christ exhibits the absolute in his finite existence as fully actual. Second, even briefly, we will trace the theological-anthro- pological physiognomy of the Mystery of the Incarnation by means of an inquiry in its soteriological sense. In that sense, the first formal Christian theology is precious: the theology of the Fathers of the Church. So, we intend to point to the way in which Christian faith contributes to the clarification of the singular super-natural quality that defines human nature in its divine connaturality: possibility of always being more and better in the world. (shrink)

José Blanco White (1775-1841) not only is an active witness of a crucial period in the political life of the Hispanic world on both sides of the Atlantic, but he is also one of the most recognized thinkers and writers of his time. His legacy includes a valuable poetic work. These pages are interested in the theological spirit of one of his most critically admired English sonnets, Night and Death. However, in order to know that own faithful way in which (...) the author expresses in his poem the human questioning for hope in the face of the experience of darkness and death, it is necessary to first penetrate, even if only in a synthetic way, in his understanding and experiencing of the relationship between religion and church, instinct of reason and truth of faith. This leads us to better meet with the background that encourages the poetic expression of his sensitivity towards the beauty of the world and the way in which man can discover in it the call of divine transcendence. (shrink)

Christian existence is permanently faced with the challenge of streng- thening the affective link between the experience of Faith and the truth of Faith. This paper tries to face this challenge through a dialogue between that peculiar human cognitive force that is empathy, and the verification that this is precisely the epistemological focus in which Gospel hermeneutics updates the meaning and salvific transcendence of the Person of Christ (dead and risen) for the witness of any time who meets Him.

We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's and Benbaji's interpretations of Reid's (...) views on causation and explanation. Finally, we present Reid's views from the perspective of the contemporary debate on scientific explanation. (shrink)

La pregunta por el modo de orientar la vida se revela como una de las más serias y apremiantes. Tanto en su acepción sacra, que remite a una llamada trascendente, como en su concepción laica, que vincula el sentimiento de felicidad con la propia realización personal, la palabra vocación quiere indicar el modo adecuado que sigue el sujeto para desempeñarse con éxito en la vida. Quizá por ello, cuando se habla de vocación resuenan aquellos elementos que componen la identidad del (...) ser humano: corporeidad y espiritualidad, intimidad y relacionalidad, inteligencia y sensibilidad, conciencia y libertad, biografía personal e historia colectiva. El desencanto causado por la «liquidez» axioló­gica, la demagogia política, el pragmatis­mo económico, la incertidumbre eco­lógica, el narcisismo digital y la uniformidad cultural en los que parece haberse instalado la antropología del trashombre, urge a elaborar un nuevo modelo de orientación vocacional que enseñe a vivir desde la «autotrascendencia» y la «ultimidad personal», o sea, desde la alteridad, la relación, la libertad y el don. Puesto que, sin vocación, el ser personal se condena a tratarse y ser tratado con indiferencia. (shrink)

Si se identifica libertad con voluntad, se corre el riesgo de tomar a la primera como el único aspecto en que la voluntad se desenvuelve, es decir, considerar el querer como mera actualización de la libertad. Pero la libertad no es más que un aspecto parcial de la voluntad, un aspecto cualitativo del querer, pues el dinamismo de la voluntad procede de su naturaleza y no del hecho de la libertad del acto del querer. La relación entre la inteligencia y (...) la voluntad es lo que caracteriza al acto específicamente humano. Por ello, se impone el análisis de la reciprocidad de influencia de las dos facultades espirituales en su propia unidad viva y funcional, pues si bien el libre albedrío se identifica con el momento de la elección, la libertad recorre todo el acto humano. Puesto que la voluntad tiende naturalmente a lo que supone perfeccionamiento del hombre, la libertad debe fomentar en el caso concreto esa orientación natural de la voluntad, es decir, elevarla a la práctica en la realidad concreta. Que la libertad disponga de la posibilidad de obrar en contra o al margen de ella, es decir, de romper de alguna forma la orientación natural de la voluntad, violentándola y torciéndola, es un defecto y también una forma de esclavitud, pues el hombre cuando obra el mal peca actúa al margen de la razón, conduciéndose como si fuese movido por otro distinto de él mismo. La posibilidad de apartarse del bien no pertenece a la esencia y a la perfección de la libertad, pues ésta consiste en obrar según la razón, impulso propio de acuerdo con su naturaleza. Los dos planos o motivaciones determinantes en que se articula la voluntad, como son el querer natural y necesario y, además, el querer deliberado y libre, son imprescindibles para dar un enfoque correcto al problema de la libertad: pues lo importante es apreciar en la acción libre la parte que se debe a la naturaleza de la voluntad, dándose la libertad únicamente como posibilidad de poner por obra un acto volitivo de acuerdo o no con la orientación natural de aquélla. El interés de esta indagación se centra especialmente en la voluntad deliberada o amor electivo del Bien. Podrá comprobarse la armonía constitutiva que reina entre la intención del fin y la elección de los medios, tema central cuando se estudia la psicología y la filosofía moral de Santo Tomás de Aquino. Las siguientes páginas se deciden a favor de la distinción entre intención del fin -intentio finis- y elección de los medios -electio mediorum-, haciendo partícipe a la voluntad deliberada del último fin en concreto, es decir, de Dios, a través de la intención, salvando así el poder de autodeterminación de la voluntad hacia el fin último en concreto, con lo que se abren las puertas a la conducta moral del hombre. Santo Tomás enfoca el problema de la libertad sin excluir ninguno de los tres planos en los que se articula, como son el plano ontológico, el plano psicológico y el plano moral, ya que el hombre tiene el deber de realizar en cada momento el máximo de su libertad en orden al perfeccionamiento de su ser, en una costosa labor de autocreación y no de caprichosa elección. Así, pues, el mayor ejercicio de libertad humana está en decidirse por su último fin en concreto, es decir, por Dios, a través de una adecuada elección de medios y de una recta intención, pues el hombre, en tanto que criatura, procede de Dios, y en tanto que hombre, tiene su fin último en la glorificación de Dios, en un doble ritmo de procesión y de retorno, poniéndose así de manifiesto el carácter religioso de la moral. Es por ello que el problema de la libertad es, en último término, un problema metafísico, que consiste en el movimiento natural y deliberado de la persona humana hacia su plenitud. (shrink)

We review some results in the theory of non-relativistic quantum unstable systems. We account for the most important definitions of quantum resonances that we identify with unstable quantum systems. Then, we recall the properties and construction of Gamow states as vectors in some extensions of Hilbert spaces, called Rigged Hilbert Spaces. Gamow states account for the purely exponential decaying part of a resonance; the experimental exponential decay for long periods of time physically characterizes a resonance. We briefly discuss one of (...) the most usual models for resonances: the Friedrichs model. Using an algebraic formalism for states and observables, we show that Gamow states cannot be pure states or mixtures from a standard view point. We discuss some additional properties of Gamow states, such as the possibility of obtaining mean values of certain observables on Gamow states. A modification of the time evolution law for the linear space spanned by Gamow shows that some non-commuting observables on this space become commuting for large values of time. We apply Gamow states for a possible explanation of the Loschmidt echo. (shrink)

In this review, we present a rigorous construction of an algebraic method for quantum unstable states, also called Gamow states. A traditional picture associates these states to vectors states called Gamow vectors. However, this has some difficulties. In particular, there is no consistent definition of mean values of observables on Gamow vectors. In this work, we present Gamow states as functionals on algebras in a consistent way. We show that Gamow states are not pure states, in spite of their representation (...) as Gamow vectors. We propose a possible way out to the construction of averages of observables on Gamow states. The formalism is intended to be presented with sufficient mathematical rigor. (shrink)

Este documento registra la entrevista al comunicador social Juan Manuel Rojas, gerente general de Creative Forward Films SAC (en el Perú), que ha realizado estudios orientados al tema audiovisual en la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, la Universidad Católica Argentina y la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. El propósito de esta conversación fue que se conociera de manera panorámica en qué consiste la formación de un comunicador y cómo esta es de utilidad para emprender un trabajo dirigido (...) a la práctica de lo audiovisual. Con las experiencias del entrevistado, se consigue construir una idea del universo cinematográfico en cuanto al desarrollo de los guiones y sus estructuras, el dominio especializado del lenguaje como herramienta fundamental y persuasiva para la publicidad, la crítica a las producciones de cine, los concursos que se promueven para respaldar la labor de los directores, etc. (shrink)

This chapter will explore the reception of Condillac in Argentina from the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, focusing on two cases. First, the reception by nineteenth-century professors of idéologie (Juan Crisóstomo Lafinur, Juan Manuel Fernández de Agüero, Luis José de la Peña, and Diego Alcorta) that was mediated by the interpretations of Antoine Destutt de Tracy, Pierre Jean Cabanis, and Pierre Laromiguière. Second, the reception in the early twentieth century by José Ingenieros, whose narrative was (...) conditioned by his own political and philosophical agenda. In each case, we can identify different receptions that must be interpreted not only in light of the philosophical concerns of the authors who made them but also in light of the wider cultural and political context in which they emerged. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Condillac was received as a philosopher who integrated the new philosophical canon that would replace the Scholastic canon that had been imposed by the colonial regime. In the early twentieth century, Ingenieros inserted Condillac into a narrative that, starting with Bacon and Locke, culminated in positivism, a current that, in his view, offered the best framework to make Argentina shine in the concert of civilized nations. (shrink)

O presente artigo busca analisar, no aspecto da imagem fílmica, os documentários de arquivo sobre a Fórmula 1 em seus primórdios garagistas (pré-1950 ao fim da década de 1970). Para isso, serão analisados três documentários recentes sobre grandes pilotos da categoria, a saber: Jack Brabham, Graham Hill e Juan Manuel Fangio. Utilizando a teorização de Gilles Deleuze acerca da imagem-movimento e seus aspectos semióticos, o objetivo aqui é ver que a cadeia de significação provocada pela reedição de imagens (...) de arquivo provoca a construção de um argumento que ressalta mais o lado humano dos pilotos do que os seus feitos enquanto esportistas consagrados. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is commonly characterized as the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. Little has been said, however, on how best to construe these representational devices—in other words, on what conceptual engineering should be all about. This paper tackles this problem with a basic strategy: First, by presenting a taxonomy of the different possible subject matters for conceptual engineering; then, by comparatively assessing them and selecting the most conducive one with a view to making conceptual engineering an actionable (...) method, that is, a method that can be applied effectively and consistently to specific case studies. The outcome is that conceptual engineering should be all about concepts on pain of pragmatic inconsistencies otherwise. (shrink)

In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...) the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories. (shrink)

This paper discusses the logical space of alternative conceptual engineering projects, with a specific focus on (1) the processes, (2) the targets and goals, and (3) the methods of such projects. We present an overview of how these three aspects interact in the contemporary literature and discuss those alternative projects that have yet to be explored based on our suggested typology. We show how choices about each element in a conceptual engineering project constrain the possibilities for the others, thereby giving (...) rise to distinct groupings of possible projects under the banner of conceptual engineering. We conclude with a critical reflection on the potential ethical issues that arise as a result of effectively putting conceptual engineering into practice. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering means to provide a method to assess and improve our concepts working as cognitive devices. But conceptual engineering still lacks an account of what concepts are (as cognitive devices) and of what engineering is (in the case of cognition). And without such prior understanding of its subject matter, or so it is claimed here, conceptual engineering is bound to remain useless, merely operating as a piecemeal approach, with no overall grip on its target domain. The purpose of this (...) programmatic paper is to overcome this knowledge gap by providing some guidelines for developing the theories of concepts and of cognition that will ground the systematic unified framework needed to effectively implement conceptual engineering as a widely applicable method for the cognitive optimization of our conceptual devices. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual (...) engineering — namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. Some have recently claimed that the implementation of such method in the form of ameliorative projects is truth-driven and should thus be epistemically constrained, ultimately at least (Simion 2018; cf. Podosky 2018). This paper challenges that claim on the assumption of a social constructionist analysis of ideologies, and provides an alternative, pragmatic and cognitive framework for determining the legitimacy of ameliorative conceptual projects overall. The upshot is that one should (...) not ameliorate for the sake of truth or knowledge, in the case of ideologies—at least, not primarily. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. On its ‘broad-spectrum’ version, it is expected to be appropriately applicable to any of our representation-involving cognitive activities, with major consequences for our whole cognitive life. This paper is about the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering thus characterised. With a view to ensuring the actionability of conceptual engineering as a broad-spectrum method, it addresses the issue of how best to construe the subject matter of conceptual engineering and successively (...) defends the theses that conceptual engineering should be: (i) About concepts, (ii) psychologically theorised, (iii) as multiply realised functional kinds. Thereby, I claim to theoretically secure and justify the maximum scope, flexibility, and impact for the method of conceptual engineering on our representational devices in our whole cognitive life—in other words, a broad-spectrum version of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the idea of human dignity has a precise and philosophically relevant sense. Following recent works,we can find some important clues in the long history of the term.Traditionally, dignity conveys the idea of a high and honourable position in a hierarchical order, either in society or in nature. At first glance, nothing may seem more contrary to the contemporary conception of human dignity, especially in regard to human rights.However,an account of dignity as high rank provides (...) an illuminating perspective on the role it plays in the egalitarian discourse of human rights. In order to preserve that relational sense regarding human dignity, we can use the notion of moral status, towhich somemoral philosophers have paid attention in recent years.I explore the possibilities of the idea of moral status to better understand the idea of human dignity and its close relationship with human rights. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on (...) general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Much of our know-how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After showing how a version of the puzzle arises from a set of attractive principles, I argue that the best solution is to hold that knowledge-how comes in degrees, (...) and through practice a person gradually learns how to do something. However, the two standard accounts of know-how in the literature, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, cannot properly account for the distinctive way in which know-how is gradually acquired by practice, a process in which conceptual representations and practical abilities are intimately interwoven. Drawing on Gareth Evans's work, I outline an account that may do so, and use this account to distinguish between two forms of learning to explain why skill generally cannot be learnt through testimony, and requires practice. (shrink)

Of all the risks we face in life, ranging from unemployment to old age, early death is among the most tragic and yet most neglected by modern states. Liberal egalitarians might find it easy to dismiss social insurance against early death, but I argue they should not. Early in this paper, I explain why social insurance should include the risk of premature death by replying to four common criticisms. What follows is a case for a novel form of insurance that (...) is more liberal and egalitarian across ages than the status quo. More specifically, I show that granting storable pensions in all life stages - youth, middle and old age - promotes liberty and reduces lifetime inequality. Writers on age group and longevity justice often overlook the extent to which liberal lifetime equality can supply insightful arguments against inequality across ages. These call for a policy that gives each age group the freedom to draw a storable pension. I call that policy "freetirement". (shrink)

Carlos Vaz Ferreira argues that the problem of freedom is conceptually distinct from the problem of causal determinism. The problem of freedom is ultimately a problem regarding the ontologically independent agency of a being, and the problem of determinism is a problem regarding explanations of events or acts in terms of the totality of their antecedent causal conditions. As Vaz Ferreira sees it, failing to keep these problems apart gives rise to merely apparent but unreal puzzles pertaining to the nature (...) of freedom and its relation to determinism. In this article, I present my interpretation of Vaz Ferreira’s distinctive ideas regarding the nature of freedom and its relation to casual determinism. (shrink)

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify (...) self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery. (shrink)

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...) argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance. (shrink)

Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude (...) relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering. (shrink)

Justice Across Ages offers an attractive account of justice between the young and the old that brings together three notable principles of age-group justice: complete-lives equality, relational equality, and prudence. Yet, the book says little about the fact that many of us live longer than others, and the little it does say casts doubt on whether lifespan inequality threatens justice as construed by the three principles. This essay argues, instead, that theories of justice between the young and the old should (...) not dispense with a conception of justice between different longevity groups. It concludes that we must be sensitive to lifespan variations when designing policies to promote justice across age groups. (shrink)

Retirement is often viewed as a reward for a working life. While many have reason to want a work-free retirement, not everyone does. Should working retirees have to give up their retirement pension and, consequently, their status as retirees? The answer, I argue, boils down to whether we conceive of retirement as free time (need-free) or as leisure (work-free). In this article, I put forward a liberal case in favour of free time, despite whether our liberalism leans towards perfectionism or (...) neutralism, with social primary goods being a case in point. Applying this case for free time to retirement yields two significant policy implications. First, it demands “free synchronic combination” – that retirees may use their retirement pensions however they see fit, including to work. Second, it also yields “free diachronic combination” – that, within limits, individuals have discretionary control over how to combine retirement and work across time – thus challenging the idea that retirement should be available only in old age and not earlier in life. So far, the literature on free time focused only on narrow temporal units, such as hours and days, but there is much to gain by extending the concept into retirement. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an intermediate position between the ‘bare mathematical results’ view and the ‘transmission’ view of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena (MEPPs). I argue that, in MEPPs, it is not enough to deduce the explanandum from the generalizations cited in the explanans. Rather, we must add information regarding why those generalizations obtain. However, I also argue that it is not necessary to provide explanatory proofs of the mathematical theorems that represent those generalizations. I illustrate this with the (...) bridges of Königsberg case. -/- . (shrink)

The Enhanced Indispensability Argument appeals to the existence of Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena to justify mathematical Platonism, following the principle of Inference to the Best Explanation. In this paper, I examine one example of a MEPP—the explanation of the 13-year and 17-year life cycle of magicicadas—and argue that this case cannot be used defend the EIA. I then generalize my analysis of the cicada case to other MEPPs, and show that these explanations rely on what I will call ‘optimal (...) representations’, which are representations that capture all that is relevant to explain a physical phenomenon at a specified level of description. In the end, because the role of mathematics in MEPPs is ultimately representational, they cannot be used to support mathematical Platonism. I finish the paper by addressing the claim, advanced by many EIA defendants, that quantification over mathematical objects results in explanations that have more theoretical virtues, especially that they are more general and modally stronger than alternative explanations. I will show that the EIA cannot be successfully defended by appealing to these notions. (shrink)

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and (...) correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert you are at self-control, the less likely you are to use it. (shrink)

The bridges of Königsberg case has been widely cited in recent philosophical discussions on scientific explanation as a potential example of a structural explanation of a physical phenomenon. However, when discussing this case, different authors have focused on two different versions, depending on what they take the explanandum to be. In one version, the explanandum is the _failure_ of a given individual in performing an Eulerian walk over the bridge system. In the other version, the explanandum is the _impossibility_ of (...) performing an Eulerian walk over the bridges. The goal of this paper is to show that only the latter version amounts to a real case of a structural explanation. I will also suggest how to fix the first version, and show how my remarks apply to other purported cases of structural explanations. (shrink)

El propósito principal de este libro es mostrar hasta qué punto el pensamiento teórico de Habermas está animado por un fuerte aliento práctico, más concretamente práctico-político, con el que concretaría el muy ilustrado propósito de hacer uso público de la razón. De hecho, la intencionalidad práctica de su pensamiento es tan destacada que el conjunto de su obra se entiende mucho mejor si se la concibe, tal como él mismo insiste, como un intento de guiar con una finalidad emancipatoria el (...) camino de la praxis, o, si se prefiere, de orientar racionalmente la acción política en las sociedades contemporáneas. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a non-mechanistic interpretation of Kant's philosophy of nature. My interpretation contradicts the robust tradition of reading Kant as a mechanist about nature – or as someone who endorses the view that we can know the internally purposive causality characteristic of organisms has no place in nature. By attending closely to Kant's remarks about the possibility of internal purposiveness in nature and to key premises from Kant's arguments in the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment, we shall see (...) that it is not only plausible, but preferable, to believe that internally purposive things (i.e., organisms) exist in nature. Making room for such a belief leaves Kant with a philosophy of nature that simultaneously aligns with and surpasses the philosophies of nature offered up by his Early Modern predecessors. (shrink)

The paper argues against a commitment to metaphysical necessity, semantic modalities are enough. The best approaches to elucidate the semantic modalities are (still) versions of lingustic ersatzism and fictionalism, even if only developed in parts. Within these necessary properties and the difference between natural and semantic laws can be accounted for. The proper background theory for this is an updated version of Logical Empiricism, which is congenial to recent trends in Structural Realism. The anti-metaphysical attitude of Logical Empiricism deserves revitalization. (...) Another target besides metaphysical necessity are substantial forms of iterated modalities, as used, for instance, in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

A general mathematical framework, based on countable partitions of Natural Numbers [1], is presented, that allows to provide a Semantics to propositional languages. It has the particularity of allowing both the valuations and the interpretation Sets for the connectives to discriminate complexity of the formulas. This allows different adequacy criteria to be used to assess formulas associated with the same connective, but that differ in their complexity. The presented method can be adapted potentially infinite number of connectives and truth values, (...) therefore, it can be considered a general framework to provide semantics to several of the known logic systems (eg, LC, L3 LP, FDE). The presented semantics allow to converge to different standard semantics if the separation complexity procedure is annulled. Therefore, it can be understood as a framework that allows greater precision (in complexity terms) with respect to formula satisfaction. Naturally, because of how it is built, it can be incorporated into non-deterministic semantics. The presented procedure also allows generating valuations that grant a different truth value to each formula of propositional language. As a positive side effect, our method allows a constructive proof of the equipotence between N and N^n for all Natural n. (shrink)

En la literatura jurídica existe un acuerdo generalizado en que los topes máximos de la pena establecidos la legislación son un límite infranqueable por los jueces. Sin embargo, al abordar el límite mínimo los desacuerdos comienzan a surgir. El objetivo del presente trabajo será el de defender que los mínimos penales, si bien son vinculantes para los jueces, pueden ser dejados de lado cuando las circunstancias particulares del caso lo ameriten. El método empleado será análisis conceptual, más precisamente, al contructivismo (...) interpretativista propuesto por Ronald Dworkin, aplicado al estudio de la jurisprudencia y la doctrina argentina. El resultado final será una justificación – apoyada en la concepción comunicativa del castigo – según la cual los límites mínimos pueden ser dejados de lado en casos concretos y excepcionales, como cuando la culpabilidad del acusado o la lesividad de su conducta se muestran desproporcionadas con el límite mínimo. De esta manera se busca dar respuesta a un problema que se encuentra presente en la práctica jurídica y, sobre todo, brindar herramientas argumentativas para que los operadores judiciales puedan resolver aquellos casos donde este límite se encuentre en discusión. (shrink)

Through modern driver assistant systems, algorithmic decisions already have a significant impact on the behavior of vehicles in everyday traffic. This will become even more prominent in the near future considering the development of autonomous driving functionality. The need to consider ethical principles in the design of such systems is generally acknowledged. However, scope, principles and strategies for their implementations are not yet clear. Most of the current discussions concentrate on situations of unavoidable crashes in which the life of human (...) beings is existentially affected. In this paper, we argue that ethical considerations should be mandatory for any algorithmic decision of autonomous vehicles, instead of a limitation to hazard situations. Such an ethically aligned behavior is relevant because autonomous vehicles, like any other traffic participants, operate in a shared public space, where every behavioral decision impacts the operational possibilities of others. These possibilities concern the fulfillment of a road-user’s safety, utility and comfort needs. We propose that, to operate ethically in such space, an autonomous vehicle will have to take its behavior decisions according to a just distribution of operational possibilities among all traffic participants. Using an application on a partially-autonomous prototype vehicle, we describe how to apply and implement concepts of distributive justice to the driving environment and demonstrate the impact on its behavior in comparison to an advanced but egoistic decision maker. (shrink)

Some partitions of Natural Number set are built through recursive processesgenerating in this manner countable examples of countable and disjoint sets whose unionis a set also countable. This process is constructive, so the Axiom of choice is not used.We provide a PC program that generates one of these special partitions and shows howto generate infinite of them. This line of reasoning can have multiple applications in Settheory and Model theory. We proved that the number of ways to make these partitionsof (...) natural numbers is not countable, there are more of these partitions (named doublycountable) than natural numbers. For each natural number greater than 1, we show aneffective procedure that generates these partitions -/- . (shrink)

Self-control is deemed crucial for reasons-responsive agency and a key contributor to long-term wellbeing. But recent studies suggest that effortfully resisting one’s temptations does not contribute to long-term goal attainment, and can even be harmful. So how does self-control improve our lives? Finding an answer requires revising the role that overcoming temptation plays in self-control. This paper distinguishes two forms of self-control problems: temptation (the presence of a strong wayward motivation) and apathy (the lack of commitment-advancing motivation). This distinction makes (...) it possible to separate negative self-control (aimed at overcoming temptation) from positive self-control (aimed at overcoming lack of motivation). The paper argues that temptation should not play a central role in our conception of self-control, since overcoming temptation is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful self-control. (shrink)

I argue that normative requirements should be interpreted as the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic. Semantically, normative requirements are conditionals understood as restrictors, the prevailing view of conditionals in linguistics. This means that Modus Ponens is invalid, even when the premises are known.

In this paper I argue for a novel interpretation of Shepherd’s notion of selfhood. In distinction to Deborah Boyle’s interpretation, I contend that Shepherd differentiates between the mind and the self. The latter, for Shepherd, is an effect arising from causal interactions between mind and body – specifically those interactions that give rise to our present stream of consciousness, our memories, and that can unite these two. Thus, the body plays a constitutive role in the formation of the self. The (...) upshot of this interpretation is that it can dissolve the problem of individuating mind that Boyle identifies. Briefly, the problem consists in Shepherd seemingly individuating minds in terms of their associated bodies and bodies in terms of the minds they are united with. My interpretation, however, allows to see that Shepherd neither wants nor needs to individuate the mind in isolation of the body and to read the passages, in which the problem seems to arise, as being about what makes living beings individual – with mind and body both playing a crucial role in this context. (shrink)